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Abstract
Recent experiments on ants and slime moulds have assessed the degree to which they make rational decisions when
presented with a number of alternative food sources or shelter. Ants and slime moulds are just two examples of a wide
range of species and biological processes that use positive feedback mechanisms to reach decisions. Here we use a generic,
experimentally validated model of positive feedback between group members to show that the probability of taking the
best of n options depends crucially on the strength of feedback. We show how the probability of choosing the best option
can be maximized by applying an optimal feedback strength. Importantly, this optimal value depends on the number of
options, so that when we change the number of options the preference of the group changes, producing apparent
‘‘irrationalities’’. We thus reinterpret the idea that collectives show "rational" or "irrational" preferences as being a necessary
consequence of the use of positive feedback. We argue that positive feedback is a heuristic which often produces fast and
accurate group decision-making, but is always susceptible to apparent irrationality when studied under particular
experimental conditions.
Citation: Nicolis SC, Zabzina N, Latty T, Sumpter DJT (2011) Collective Irrationality and Positive Feedback. PLoS ONE 6(4): e18901. doi:10.1371/journal.
pone.0018901
Editor: Yamir Moreno, University of Zaragoza, Spain
Received December 21, 2010; Accepted March 11, 2011; Published April 26, 2011
Copyright:  2011 Nicolis et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: Human Frontier Science Program (RGP 51/2007) (http://www.hfsp.org/). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision
to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: snicolis@math.uu.se
Introduction
Several recent studies have begun to investigate the collective
rationality of distributed biological systems [1,2]. A striking result is
that acellular slime mould Physarum polycephalum makes irrational
decisions, in the sense that its preference for food items of varying
quality changes when its choice set is expanded [1]. These results are
reminiscent of choice patterns seen in humans participating in
decision-making tasks, where the relative attractiveness of two
options often depends on the presence or absence of a third option
[3,4]. Such preference changes violate independence from irrelevant
alternatives (IIA), because a new option of lesser value apparently
alters the value of the two superior options, and can thus be classified
as ‘irrational’ [5]. In addition to slime moulds, rationality has been
studied in house-hunting Temnothorax ants. Unlike slime moulds,
Temnothorax ants are, in some situations, collectively immune to
irrationality and do not violate IIA [2,6].
Several authors have pointed out that rationality cannot be
studied in isolation from mechanisms [4,7]. Gigerenzer emphasises
the importance of heuristics, which are fast methods for making
decisionsonthe basisofonlysmallamounts ofavailableinformation
[8,9]. The key questions to ask in such a framework are ‘‘In what
environments will a given heuristic work? Where will it fail?’’ [9].
Forcollective decision-making,thekeyheuristicispositivefeedback,
whereby commitment to a particular option increases as a function
of the number of individuals already committed to it [10–12]. In the
light of the new experiments classifying ants and slime mould as
‘‘rational’’ or ‘‘irrational’’, it is important to link these outcomes to
the positive feedback heuristic: in what environments do we expect
positive feedback to produce accurate decisions and in what
circumstances do we expect it to fail?
For Physarum and Temnothorax ants, the feedback mechanisms by
which these systems reach decisions are relatively well understood.
For Physarum, positive feedback is mediated through the growth of
tubes as a result of protoplasmic flow [13]. Positive feedback in
Temnothorax ants is in the form of tandem running which recruits
nestmates to good quality nests with a switch to a rapid transport
of nestmates after a quorum threshold is reached [14]. In this
paper, we consider the problem of choosing between multiple
options in a general model of positive feedback supported by
experimental evidence, namely the Deneubourg model of
collective decision-making [15]. The model describes two or more
competing positive feedback loops, each of which measures how
the build up of commitment to a particular option evolves in time.
We assume that each option has an associated quality encoded
by the variable i. We also assume that commitment decays at a
constant rate n for each option. The evolution of the commitments
xi to option i can thus be cast in the form [10]
dxi
dt
~w ifi x1,:::xn ðÞ {nxi i~1,::n ðÞ ð 1Þ
where the flux w determines the overall strength of positive
feedback. Note that for animal groups w can be thought of the
number of individuals per time step making a decision, or as
proportional to the size of the population.
The choice function fi (f1§0) expresses how future commitment
to i is affected by the current commitment both to i and its
competitors j=i. fi is chosen to provide a quorum-like response, so
that above a threshold the rate of increase in commitment
becomes significantly larger. The detailed mechanisms behind the
resulting positive feedback and the specific forms of fi depend on
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modeling the increase in flow as a function of tube thickness [16].
Other mechanisms generating quorum-like positive feedbacks
are trails formation [10,17], following behavior by fish [18],
interactions between individuals in connection with aggregation
like processes [19–21] and imitation by primates [22]. Imitation is
also the dominant feedback mechanism in the context of decision-
making phenomena involving human populations. The situation
for Temnothorax ants is more complicated. For these ants fi can be
considered linear, since tandem running recruits ants in propor-
tion to the number of ants already recruiting, but there is a
quorum switch to transporting of nestmates above a certain
threshold [14]. In what follows we will use a form of fi, inspired by
theoretical and experimental work on food recruitment in social
insects by Deneubourg and co-workers [17,23,24], written as
fi~
1zxi ðÞ
m
Pn
j~1 1zxj
   m ð2Þ
The parameter m measures the sensitivity of the particular
choice. The larger the m the sharper the choice and, at the same
time, the higher the nonlinearity involved in the process. In this
paper, we will study the reference case where m~2 corresponding
to the minimal setting of co-operativity, and subsequently see if the
conclusions persist for different values of this parameter.
Results and Discussion
Figure 1 shows the bifurcation diagrams of the steady state
solution of eqs.(1)–(2), i.e., how the steady state level of
commitment for the best option changes with the flux w for
n~2, n~3 and n~4. As the flux increases the system switches
from having one stable state with a small majority committed to
the option with the highest value of i to having multiple steady
states with stronger commitment to one of the options. In this
latter situation, there is one steady state corresponding to a high
level of commitment to the highest quality option, but there also
exist alternative stable states corresponding to commitment to one
or more of the lower quality options. Here, the chosen option
depends on initial conditions. For example, in figure 1a the arrows
show how different initial commitment levels will evolve. If
commitment is initially strong for the lower quality option then the
system moves towards choosing this option. We do not label such a
situation as ‘irrational’ since it is common to see humans and other
animals having a range of possible choices depending on their
initial preferences. Indeed, it may well be optimal to choose the
option closer to an initial preference.
We can however show that it is this multi-stability that can lead
to irrationality when the number of choices available to a decision-
maker is changed. The first point to note is how the bifurcation
diagrams in figure 1 depend on the number of options. In
particular, the bifurcation point where more than one steady state
appears increases with the number of options. For n~2 this
bifurcation point is w ~0:267, for n~3 it is w ~0:3175, and for
n~4 it is w ~0:3665. We note also that the stable branch
corresponding to a majority commitment to the higher quality
option moves to the right as the number of choices increases. In
other words, the preferences change with the number of options.
The quality of a decision does not simply depend on whether or
not the best option is chosen by more individuals than any of the
other options. The size of the level of commitment is also
important. For example, in figure 1b when w~0:01 only a very
small 36% choose the best option, while 32% choose each of the
two poorer options. This is to be compared to w~0:6 where 96%
choose the best option. Thus the quality of decision can be defined
as a combination of (a) the proportion of individuals committed to
the better option and (b) the proportion of cases where this option
is selected over the less favorable one. This latter quantity depends
on initial conditions and/or random factors and cannot be
calculated from eqs.(1) – (2) alone. We therefore use our Monte
Carlo simulation to calculate (b) for n~2,3 and 4 (see materials
and methods).
Figure 2a presents the proportion of individuals x1=
P
jxj
  
selecting the higher quality option, averaged over many Monte
Carlo realizations. This plot corresponds to the upper branch of
Figure 1a. Figure 2b provides the number of cases in which the
higher quality option is preferred over the total number of Monte
Carlo realizations (i.e., cases in which x1wx2,x3,::: at steady state).
Figure 2c multiplies these curves pointwise to provide an overall
measure of how quality of decision depends on flow rate w for
different numbers of options. In all cases, the strongest bias to the
highest quality option occurs near to the bifurcation point, w ,
where the system goes from one to more than one steady state.
This result can be contrasted to Condorcet’s theorem, which states
that large groups are able to make better decisions [25–27]. More
Figure 1. Bifurcation diagrams of x1=
Pn
j~1 xj corresponding to the steady state level of commitment for the better option (eqs. (3) –
(6))with respect to the flow rate w. (a) case n~2, (b) n~3 and (c) n~4. Full and dashed lines correspond to stable and unstable solutions
respectively. The stability has been checked numerically by integrating the full eqs. (1) – (2). The arrows indicate the evolution of initial conditions on
the two sides of a threshold value corresponding to the intermediate unstable state. Parameter values are 1~0:11, ~0:1, m~2 and n~0:01s{1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018901.g001
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considered [28]. Here we have shown that the quality of decision is
not just a matter of population size (in our model captured by the
flow parameter w) but is affected by the strength of the positive
feedbacks along with the number of options presented.
Decision-making is often associated with a speed-accuracy
trade-off, where a more accurate decision requires more time to
reach [12,29,30]. Recent theoretical and experimental work has
shown that such a tradeoff does not always hold. For example,
Katsikopoulos et al. [7] show using computer simulations that a
‘take the best’ heuristic method can make better decisions using
less computational effort without suffering an accuracy loss.
Predator avoidance experiments on fish have shown that larger
groups make decisions more rapidly and more accurately than
smaller groups or solitary fish [31]. To address this question in our
system, we consider the rate at which a decision is reached as we
increase the flow parameter w. This rate is determined by the
largest eigenvalue, which we will denote l, for the steady state
corresponding to the better option. The time taken to reach a
decision is proportional to the inverse of the magnitude of l (l is
always negative). As we increase w, the magnitude of l increases
and thus the time to reach a decision decreases. Conversely,
reducing the flow parameter to a level below w  (i.e. the point at
which accuracy is maximized) will lead to a slower, as well as a less
accurate decision. In short, there is no trade-off between speed and
accuracy here, rather there is an optimal parameter where both
are maximised.
Our results hold for any number of options. Figure 3a gives this
quality measure for a complete parameter scan of the model for
multiple options and a full range of flows w. Again, the maximal
decision quality occurs near the bifurcation point, w . The position
of the bifurcation point increases linearly with the number of
options. For m~3 (see Figure 3b), the situation resembles to our
canonical case m~2 except that the transition from one to more
than one steady state is sharper, which is not very surprising as m
can be viewed as a parameter controlling the accuracy of the
decision. Our results appear robust provided mw1. This is exactly
the conditions for a quorum-like response in the positive feedback.
The exception, where there is no quorum-like response, is m~1
(figure 3c) and we discuss this case further below.
Until now, we assumed that the best option was slightly higher
in its quality than the other one ( 1~0:11, i=1~0:1). In Figure 4
we show the combined effect of an increasing option quality and
an increasing flow rate on the quality of decision for three different
numbers of options. The region where the quality of decision is
near maximal becomes wider as 1 increases. On the other hand
when the number of options increases the maximum is shifted
towards higher values of the flow rate and of the quality of the
better option.
For any given number of options the decision-making outcome
is different. In particular, the flow level at which the highest quality
option is chosen most often depends on this particular number. In
a situation where it is optimal to pick the highest quality option
irrespective of initial conditions, then we can see that a value of w 
Figure 2. Quantitative view of the quality of decision as a function of the flow rate w as obtained by Monte Carlo simulations. (a)
Mean level of commitment for the better option 1, (b) Probability of selection of the better option and (c) Quality of decision for three different
numbers of options. Parameter values as in Fig. 1, number of realizations is 5000.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018901.g002
Figure 3. Decision quality as a function of the flow rate of individuals w and of the number of options n as obtained by Monte Carlo
simulations. (a) case m~2, (b) m~3 and (c) m~1. Other parameter values as in Fig. 1, number of realizations is 5000.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018901.g003
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not optimized for choosing between three or more options.
Likewise, a flow level which might make good decisions between
four options can perform poorly when faced with a decision
between two. This result is highly counterintuitve, since we would
not expect a system to make a worse decision when confronted
with a smaller number of options. Indeed, it is here that we can
talk about a system behaving irrationally. Alternative dummy
choices adjust the outcome of choice experiments, and in such a
way that an obviously better option is chosen less often.
Experiments testing the effect of additional choices in decision-
making do not start from the premise that one option is always
optimal, independent of initial conditions. For house hunting ants
or foraging slime mould there is a cost to be paid in switching
between options if there is already an established commitment for
one particular option. Indeed, when offered two options of similar
although not identical quality over multiple trials, ants and slime
mould do not aggregate at the same option in every trial [1,2].
Instead they choose the one which elicits the greatest initial build-
up of commitment [16,32]. Our model shows that introducing a
third option in such situations will always change the expressed
preferences. In figure 2 we introduce a third option of equal
quality to the second, but the results are not contingent on these
two options being the same. Rather, the introduction of additional
options always has the potential to reveal ‘irrationality’ in
experimental situations.
Species differences can, through our model, explain differences
in the outcome of rationality experiments. Positive feedback is very
strong in slime moulds, suggesting mw1. Tube connections
between food sources build rapidly, the slime mould will usually
choose only one of many identical food sources [16] and the tubes
remain stable even when conditions change [33]. This may
explain why the choice patterns of slime mould depend so strongly
on the number of options presented. The situation is reversed for
ants. Here tandem running provides a weak positive feedback and
when the number of choices is increased the ants preferences
remain stable [2]. Roughly speaking, weak feedback corresponds
to setting m~1, although see Pratt et al. [14,34] for a more
detailed model of Temnotorax emigration. Figure 3c shows that the
parameter scan looks very different than m~2. Here, there is only
one solution to equations (1) – (2). This corresponds to the better
option being selected 100% of the cases, but with a relatively low
level of commitment. In this case, the proportion of commitment
increases linearly with the flux for a particular number of options,
and decreases again smoothly with the number of options for a
particular value of the flux.
Many of the standard models of decision-making assume that
choice is a linear process [8,35]. For example, Busemeyer and
Townsend use a linear stochastic difference equation for the
change of the preference state in the course of time [4]. This
equation (cf. eq. (7) of ref. [4]) features in turn quantities indicating
the propensity to choose the different options which bear some
resemblance with our choice functions fi, eq.(2), the main
difference being the absence of cooperativity. In order to
reproduce violations of independence of irrelevant alternatives,
these models include updating rules in which comparison between
options influence the strength by which various options are
preferred. Here, we have shown that IIA violating outcomes can
arise naturally from the underlying dynamics without varying
comparison schemes, provided we have a non-linear choice
function with mw1. There is strong experimental evidence in
amoeba and social insects that such non-linear feedbacks are
present, and they may well be present in behavioral science and
particularly in psychology as well. Indeed, in terms of our criteria
(a) and (b) for the quality of decision-making (cf our earlier
comments in connection with figure 2), mw1 is superior to m~1
and could thus be expected to be a widely used heuristic.
Models of decision-making in the visual cortex and other areas
of the brain usually assume feedbacks between groups of neurons,
with each group accumulating evidence for a particular option
[36,37]. There are strong parallels between the positive feedback
system described by Deneubourg’s and other models of social
insect decision-making and these neuronal models, although in the
latter case the focus is usually on cross-inhibition [38]. As a
consequence some functions of the human brain are likely to be
subject to the same constraints resulting from the model presented
here. In particular, if we change the number of options in a
decision-making situation, we expect the corresponding stability of
steady states to change and as a result choice preferences will also
change. This is exactly what is observed in choice experiments on
individual humans and animals [3,39,40]. So called "irrationality"
could again be a here a consequence of the mechanisms employed
within the brain. More work is certainly needed to test this idea.
One of the interests of our approach has been to raise the issue of
rationality in the context of cellular and population biology where
quantitative experiments can be carried out in detail and modeling
and simulation approaches calibrated by experimental data can be
developed.
In summary, we have shown here that concepts such as
increasing accuracy with group size, speed-accuracy tradeoffs and
"irrational" decisions are strongly correlated to the coexistence of
multiple stable steady states. In the context of systems based on
Figure 4. Decision quality as a function of the flow rate of individuals w and of the quality of the better option 1 ( i=1~1)a s
obtained by Monte Carlo simulations. (a) case n~2, (b) n~4 and (c) n~8. Other parameter values as in Fig. 1, number of realizations is 5000.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018901.g004
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respects to be terms for describing the possibility that decisions can
have different outcomes dependent on initial conditions. In
particular, "irrationality" can be created in such systems simply
by conducting an experiment in which the positive feedback is
sufficiently high to generate multiple steady states. The question is
not then whether a system is "irrational" or not, but rather why it
uses strong positive feedback?
Materials and Methods
We study the above model in two ways, both as a system of
differential equations as defined by eqs.(1) – (2) and as a Monte
Carlo simulation. In the latter case, decision-making is modeled as
a stochastic process of transitions towards states whose probabil-
ities, given by fi are being continuously updated as the process is
advancing in time. More specifically, the simulation starts with the
number of individuals on each option equal to zero. The first
decision concerns the individuals to choose or not to choose, given
by a probability equal to w. The second decision is the actual
choice of one option, governed by eq.(2). During time evolution,
when an individual chooses an option i, it reinforces the
probability fi to choose in the future that option but at the same
time there is a fixed rate at which individuals abandon the option
(parameter n). The process is repeated for a number of steps
sufficient to reach the stationary state.
We focus on the situation in which one option is better than all
the other ones considered to be of equal quality ( iw j=i~ ). The
mean field equations (1) – (2) yield then in the steady state explicit
expressions for the xi’s. One has successively,
2
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being understood that in eqs.(5) – (6) the population splits into two
groupschoosingrespectivelyj options such that x2~   ~xjz1~x2
and n{j{1 options such that xjz2~   ~xn~1=x2,t h eb e t t e r
option 1 still being chosen by x1.
A typical way to summarize the behavior of the solutions of
eqs.(3) – (6) is to draw bifurcation diagrams as in Fig. 1 in which
the value of the relevant variable at the steady state is plotted
against one of the parameters present in the problem.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: SCN DJTS. Performed the
experiments: SCN NZ. Analyzed the data: NZ SCN DJTS. Wrote the
paper: DJTS SCN NZ TL.
References
1. Latty T, Beekman M (2011) Irrational decision-making in an amoeboid
organism: transitivity and context-dependent preferences. Proceedings of the
Royal Society B-Biological Sciences 278: 307–312.
2. Edwards SC, Pratt SC (2009) Rationality in collective decision-making by ant
colonies. Proceedings of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences 276:
3655–3661.
3. Tversky A, Simonson I (1993) Context-Dependent Preferences. Management
Science 39: 1179–1189.
4. Busemeyer JR, Townsend JT (1993) Decision field-theory - a dynamic cognitive
approach to decision-making in an uncertain environment. Psychological
Review 100: 432–459.
5. Luce RD (1959) Individual choice behavior: a theoretical analysis. New York:
Wiley 153.
6. Sasaki T, Pratt SC (2011) Emergence of group rationality from irrational
individuals. Behavioral Ecology. doi: 10.1093/beheco/arq198.
7. Katsikopoulos KV, Schooler LJ, Hertwig R (2010) The Robust Beauty of
Ordinary Information. Psychological Review 117: 1259–1266.
8. Gigerenzer G, Todd PM (1999) Simple heuristics that make us smart. New
York: Oxford University Press 416.
9. Gigerenzer G (2006) Bounded and Rational, Blackwell, chapter 7. Contempo-
rary debates in philosophy. pp 115–133.
10. Nicolis SC, Deneubourg JL (1999) Emerging Patterns and Food Recruitment in
Ants: an Analytical Study. Journal of Theoretical Biology 198: 575–592.
11. Sumpter DJT (2006) The principles of collective animal behaviour. Philosoph-
ical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences; 361: 5–22.
12. Sumpter DJT, Pratt SC (2009) Quorum responses and consensus decision
making. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences;
364: 743–753.
13. Nakagaki T, Yamada H, Toth A (2000) Maze-solving by an amoeboid organism.
Nature 407: 470–470.
14. Pratt SC, Mallon EB, Sumpter DJT, Franks NR (2002) Quorum sensing,
recruitment, and collective decision-making during colony emigration by the ant
Leptothorax albipennis. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 52: 117–127.
15. Deneubourg JL, Aron S, Goss S, Pasteels J (1990) The Self-Organizing
Exploratory Pattern of the Argentine Ant. Journal of Insect Behavior 3:
159–168.
16. Tero A, Kobayashi R, Nakagaki T (2007) A mathematical model for adaptive
transport network in path finding by true slime mold. Journal of Theoretical
Biology 244: 553–64.
17. Beckers R, Deneubourg JL, Goss S (1992) Trails and u-turns in the selection of a
path by the ant lasius-niger. Journal of Theoretical Biology 159: 397–415.
18. Ward AJW, Sumpter D, Couzin ID, Hart PJB, Krause J (2008) Quorum
decision-making facilitates information transfer in fish shoals. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 105: 6948–6953.
19. Deneubourg JL, Lioni A, Detrain C (2002) Dynamics of aggregation and
emergence of cooperation. Biological Bulletin 202: 262–267.
Collective Irrationality and Positive Feedback
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 April 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 4 | e1890120. Jeanson R, Rivault C, Deneubourg JL, Blanco S, Fournier R, et al. (2005) Self-
organized aggregation in cockroaches. Animal Behaviour 69: 169–180.
21. Nicolis SC, Theraulaz G, Deneubourg J.-L (2005) The effect of aggregates on
interaction rate in ant colonies. Animal Behaviour 69: 535–540.
22. Petit O, Gautrais J, Leca JB, Theraulaz G, Deneubourg JL (2009) Collective
decision-making in white-faced capuchin monkeys. Proceedings of the Royal
Society B-Biological Sciences 276: 3495–3503.
23. Deneubourg JL, Goss S (1989) Collective patterns and decision making.
Ethology, Ecology & Evolution 1: 295–311.
24. Camazine S, Franks NR, Sneyd J, Bonabeau E, Deneubourg JL, et al. (2001)
Self-Organization in Biological Systems. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press 560 p.
25. Condorcet JANdC (1785) Essai sur l’application de l’analyse a ` la probabilite ´ des
de ´cisions rendues a ` la pluralite ´ des voix. Paris: De l’Imprimerie royale.
26. King AJ, Cowlishaw G (2007) When to use social information: the advantage of
large group size in individual decision making. Biology Letters 3: 137–139.
27. Simons A (2004) Many wrongs: the advantage of group navigation. Trends In
Ecology & Evolution 19: 453–455.
28. Katsikopoulos K, King AJ (2010) Swarm Intelligence in Animal Groups: When
Can a Collective Out-Perform an Expert?. PloS one 5: e15505.
29. Franks N, Dornhaus A, Fitzsimmons J, Stevens M (2003) Speed versus accuracy
in collective decision making. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological
Sciences 270: 2457–2463.
30. Marshall J, Dornhaus A, Franks N, Kovacs T (2006) Noise, cost and speed-
accuracy trade-offs: decision-making in a decentralized system. Journal of the
Royal Society Interface 3: 243–254.
31. Ward AJW, Herbert-Read JE, Sumpter DJT, Krause J (2011) Fast and accurate
decisions through collective vigilance in fish shoals. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 108: 2312–2315.
32. Pratt SC, Sumpter DJT (2006) A tunable algorithm for collective decision-
making. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States
of America 103: 15906–15910.
33. Ito K, Sumpter D, Nakagaki T (2010) Risk management in spatio-temporally
varying field by true slime mold. Nonlinear Theory and Its Applications, IEICE
1: 26–36.
34. Pratt S, Sumpter D, Mallon E, Franks N (2005) An agent-based model of
collective nest choice by the ant Temnothorax albipennis. Animal Behaviour 70:
1023–1036.
35. Dawes R (1979) The robust beauty of improper linear models in decision
making. American Psychologist 34: 571–582.
36. Brown E, Gao J, Holmes P, Bogacz R, Gilzenrat M, et al. (2005) Simple neural
networks that optimize decisions. International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos
15: 803–826.
37. Usher M, McClelland J (2001) The time course of perceptual choice: The leaky,
competing accumulator model. Psychological Review 108: 550–592.
38. Marshall J, Bogacz R, Dornhaus A, Planque R, Kovacs T, et al. (2009) On
optimal decision-making in brains and social insect colonies. Journal of the
Royal Society Interface 6: 1065–1074.
39. Bateson M, Healy S, Hurly T (2003) Context-dependent foraging decisions in
rufous hummingbirds. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
270: 1271–1276.
40. Shafir S, Waite T, Smith B (2002) Context-dependent violations of rational
choice in honeybees (Apis mellifera) and gray jays (Perisoreus canadensis).
Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 51: 180–187.
Collective Irrationality and Positive Feedback
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 April 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 4 | e18901